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Drawing on Laclau’s concept of populist discourse and Gramsci’s ‘national-popular collective will’, 
and using the case of Iran, this article puts forward the idea of legacy of subalternity in the context of 
post-revolution governments. The concept of ‘national-popular collective will’ facilitates an 
understanding of how the popular subject is constructed and the meanings embedded in that process. It 
is argued that Islamic Republic elites articulate a populist discourse that constructs the ‘self’ (the 
Islamic Republic) as synonymous with ‘the people’. Embedded in this discursive construction is a 
legacy of subalternity that goes back to the 1979 Revolution’s populist discourse. 
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Introduction 
The true presence of people in the Islamic Republic, their role in electing officials and safeguarding the 
outcomes of the Islamic Revolution, are themselves symbols of the truthfulness of the Islamic regime 




The key is the presence and the support of the people. Of course, also, the government works as the 




The first text presented above is by Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei 
(1989-to present) taken from Questions and Answers in the Presence of the Supreme Leader 
published in 1380/2001-2
3
. This text explicitly constructs the ‘the people’ as an integral part 
of the Islamic Revolution and the Islamic Republic. The second text, by President Hassan 
Rouhani, is taken from a television interview given 100 days after his election. In this 
interview Rouhani is asked whether he has the ‘key’ to solving the ‘lock’ of the nuclear issue. 
Rouhani’s response is that it is ‘the people’ that have the key4. It is evident here that both 
texts from these members of Iran’s ruling elite5 prescribe a particular relationship between the 
‘rulers’ and the ‘ruled’. For these ‘rulers’ it is clear that the Islamic Republic is chosen by 
‘the people’ and is for ‘the people’. For Khamenei, this is reflected in his use of ‘mardumi’6, 
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literally ‘of the people’; and for Rouhani this is reflected in the construction of ‘the people’ as 
a political actor.  
My argument is three-fold. Firstly, drawing from Ernesto Laclau’s concept of populist 
discourse, it is argued here that these texts are indicative of a populist discourse wherein ‘the 
people’ are constructed as a political actor, and indeed as a popular subject. Additionally, the 
Islamic Republic constructs itself as synonymous with this popular subject: ‘the people’. 
Significantly, ‘the people’ represents a legacy that directly links the current Islamic Republic 
to the populist discourse of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini at the time of the 1979 Revolution.  
Secondly, it is contended that a borrowing of Antonio Gramsci’s notion of the 
‘national-popular’ facilitates an understanding of the way in which the ‘self’ is constructed as 
well as the meanings embedded in that process of construction. In this particular instance, the 
idea of the ‘national-popular collective will’ symbolises the populist discourse of the Islamic 
Republic and the continuing legitimacy of Khomeini’s Islamic Republic. In Gramscian terms, 
the establishment of the Islamic Republic following the 1979 Revolution is an example of 
subaltern groups successfully overthrowing the state hegemon and establishing themselves as 
the hegemon because they had the ‘national-popular collective will’. Thus, the ‘national-
popular collective will’ symbolises the importance of the legacy of subalternity. 
Consequently, the populist discourse of the Islamic Republic’s ruling elite illustrates what is 
essentially a post-subaltern hegemonic populist discourse that reflects a binary hegemonic 
relationship between the ‘self’ and the ‘other’. The ‘self’ is the Islamic Republic which 
constructs itself as synonymous with the people. The ‘other’ is anything that poses a threat to 
the Islamic Republic’s legacy of subalternity and its position as beholder of the ‘national-
popular collective will’. 
Finally, I argue that Rouhani’s presidential candidacy in 2013 represents an attempt to 
regain the ‘national-popular collective will’ and restore the Islamic Republic’s legacy of 
subalternity following the 2009 presidential election. Subsequently, this reinstates the Islamic 
Republic’s populist credentials as well as its legitimacy. The notion of the ‘national-popular 
collective will’ is crucial to understanding the relationship between the ‘rulers’ and the 
‘ruled’. Ultimately, this analysis of populism advocates a bringing together of Laclau’s 
populist discourse and Gramsci’s ‘national-popular collective will’. It is suggested that this 
combination can be used as a framework for looking at and deconstructing populism in post-
revolutionary situations. These are situations of post-subaltern hegemony where the legacy of 
subalternity justifies and legitimises the status of hegemony. 
In order to understand the significance of Gramsci’s ‘national-popular collective will’ 
in the case of Iran, two particular historical moments need to be addressed: the 1979 Iranian 
Revolution and the controversial 2009 presidential election. In brief, leading up to the 1979 
Revolution, Khomeini and his understanding of Shi’ite political Islam were successful in 
overturning the Pahlavi regime, arguably because he managed to embrace the ‘national-
popular collective will’. By forcing Mohammad Reza Pahlavi Shah into exile, the 1979 
Iranian Revolution is an example of a process whereby the subaltern successfully overturned 
hegemony because of the presence of the ‘national-popular’, as will be illustrated below.  
The tenth presidential election was controversial because in June 2009 the incumbent 
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was re-elected for his second and last term amidst claims 
of electoral fraud
7
 and popular uprisings
8





, and indeed Khamenei found himself in a crisis of authority and the legitimacy of 
Islamic Republic was questioned
10
. The extent of popular discontent evident in the popular 
uprisings represented a failure to embrace the ‘national-popular collective will’ and thus 
posed a threat to the Islamic Republic’s populist credentials. As far as Khamenei and 
Ahmadinejad (as well as their supporters) were concerned, there appeared to be an ‘other’ 
that threatened the Islamic Republic’s identity as the beholder of the ‘national-popular 
collective will’. This ‘other’ was essentially constructed as a threat to the Islamic Republic’s 
construction of itself as ‘the people’, and subsequently also threatened its legitimacy.  
It should also be mentioned that in addition to the clear threat to the Islamic Republic 
as the beholder of the ‘national-popular collective will’, there were other interlinked political 
dynamics that can account for Rouhani's candidacy, and ultimately his election. The first is 
intra-regime political battles; during Ahmadinejad’s presidency rifts among the conservatives 
had come to replace the divisions between the conservatives and reformist as the most 
publicised political battle.
11
 The second is Iran's deteriorating economic situation caused by a 
combination of Ahmadinejad's economic policy and the 'growing, cumulative effects of the 
sanctions'
12
, which were imposed by the UN, EU and the US in response to Iran's nuclear 
programme. The third is the desire within the regime and by many Iranians for Iran to come 
out of international isolation
13
. Thus, by the time of the 2013 presidential election, Khamenei 
needed to ‘re-build the regime's legitimacy.'14  In the context of protests and uprisings 
elsewhere in the region, Khamenei also needed to avoid further protests that could threaten 
the stability of the regime, and restore the centrality of clerical rule as opposed to the 
influence and power of military rule in the form of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp 
(IRGC)
15
. While he wanted the reassertion of conservative dominance and permitted 
Rouhani's candidacy, Rouhani's election was not his preferred choice
16
. However, Khamenei 




This popular will is reflected in Rouhani's popular mandate. Rouhani was elected as 
president on 13 June 2013 by just over 50 per cent of those who turned out to vote.
18
 He was 
popular in the provinces winning all the major provincial cities, and considerable support 
from ethnic minorities
19
. Furthermore, for many Iranians it was case of voting for Rouhani so 
as to prevent a conservative candidate from winning
20
. While Rouhani is labelled moderate, 
centrist, even reformist in some instances, he cannot be considered as anything other than part 
of the Islamic Republic's regime and part of the establishment. The popular mandate coupled 
with a mandate from above puts Rouhani in a unique and significant position
21
. It is in this 
context that Rouhani can be considered as an effort to reinstate the Islamic Republic’s 
populist credentials and its legacy of subalternity.  
It must be stressed that while ‘the people’, or the ‘national-popular collective will’, 
are constructed here by Islamic Republic elites as a monolithic entity, in reality this is far 
from the case. Iran is a multi-ethnic and multi-religious state
22
. In addition to this, there are a 
variety of aspirations regarding the nature of politics in Iran. In some instances this is 
translated into desires for substantial political change, which was clearly evident in 2009
23
. 
Among the political groups and movements involved in demanding various levels of political 
change are members from the women’s movement, labour movement, students’ movement 
and human rights activists. Notably, each of these groups is also diverse in their make-up and 
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political aspirations. In other instances the variety of political aspirations is evident in desires 
for reform from within the regime. Indeed, not only can the Iranian population not be 
considered simply in terms of ‘the people’, neither can ‘the state’ be considered as a 
monolithic entity, and is often shown to be fragmented
24
, as the above depiction of the 2013 
election shows. 
The article will first address Laclau’s populist discourse and Gramsci’s ‘national 
popular’. It will then go on to illustrate how the Islamic Republic continues to construct itself 
as ‘the people’ and the beholder of the ‘national popular collective will’ and aims to maintain 
its legacy of subalternity through the candidacy of Rouhani. 
Populist discourse and Gramsci’s national-popular  
A number of studies note the contested nature of the concept of populism and the exceptional 
vagueness of the term
25
. This ambiguity is reflected in how populism is perceived. In brief, 
on the one hand, populism is considered as a movement and/or an ideology in the same way 
that liberalism, socialism, and ‘Third Worldism’ are understood as movements and/or 
ideologies
26
. This approach is rejected by Laclau and those who build upon his discursive 
approach to populism
27
. Rather than dwelling on the vagueness of populism, Laclau suggests 
considering whether this vagueness is due to the ‘consequence of a social reality itself being 
in some situations, vague and undetermined’28. He also poses important questions about the 
ideology/movement approach: can ideology and movement be separated
29
; to what extent can 
they be considered populist
30
; and for what social and ideological reality does populism 
apply
31
. In response to his own questions Laclau asserts that there is populist discourse and 
that ideologies and movements can reflect populist discourse, albeit to varying degrees
32
.  
Importantly, for Laclau discourse exists in ‘any complex elements in which relations 
play the constitutive role.’ He argues that ‘This means that elements do not pre-exist the 
relational complex but are constituted through it.’33  In other words, elements, such as ‘the 
people’, only exist in so far as they are constructed as such through the articulation of 
discourse. And, it is ‘the people’ that reflects populism or the articulation of populist 
discourse
34
. As Francisco Panizza argues, populism is based on the constitution of the people 
as a political actor and thus, ‘the people’ is established as the ‘concept’s analytical core’35. 
Indeed, ‘we only have populism if there is a series of politico-discursive practices 
constructing a popular subject’36. Crucially, the precondition of the emergence of the 
construction of a popular subject is ‘the building of an internal frontier dividing the social 
space into two camps’37 that is enforced by the constructed binary relationship between the 
politically constructed ‘self’ and ‘other’. For Panizza, this is ‘constituted through the relation 
of antagonism’38. In this relationship, the ‘people’ (the ‘self’) are constructed as the 
‘underdogs’39 in relation to a hegemonic ‘other’. This was clearly evident in both 1979 and 
following the results of the 2009 presidential election. In 1979, through the articulation of 
Khomeini’s populist discourse, ‘the people’, constructed as the ‘self’, were in a relation of 
antagonism with the Pahlavi regime, constructed as the hegemonic ‘other’. In 2009, members 
of the ruling elite through their own discourse of populism built an internal frontier that 
divided the social space of Iran’s political arena into two camps. The ruling elites such as 
Khamenei and his supporters, who perceived themselves as synonymous with ‘the people’ 
were the legitimate ‘self’. Meanwhile, those protesting against the re-election of 
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Ahmadinejad were constructed as the ‘other’40: a hegemonic force that was a threat to ‘the 
people’ and therefore the Islamic Republic’s legacy of subalternity. It is contended that the 
candidacy of Rouhani in 2013 is an attempt to diffuse this antagonism and co-opt the 
hegemonic ‘other’. 
Gramsci’s notion of the ‘national-popular collective will’ enables a better 
understanding of the nature of the antagonistic relationship between the ‘self and ‘other’. This 
is because it facilitates an understanding of the meanings embedded in the process of 
constructing the ‘self’. It is contended that the populist discourse of members of the Islamic 
Republic’s ruling elite constructs ‘the people’ as a popular subject at the same time as 
constructing the ‘self’ as ‘the people’. In addition to this, by constructing the ‘self’ in this 
way, it is essentially constructing the ‘self’ as the beholder of the ‘national-popular collective 
will’ and asserting its legacy of subalternity. However, as noted above, the analysis here 
borrows Gramsci’s notion of ‘national-popular collective will’. A strict adherence to 
Gramsci’s notion is problematic. After all, a strict application of a concept that is created in 
relation to a particular historical experience (the desire to overthrow fascism through a 
communist revolution in Italy) to another historical experience (Iran’s 1979 Revolution) is 
problematic. Thus, Gramsci’s ‘national-popular collective will’ is analysed in conjunction 
with the 1979 Revolution. 
While it is important to note that the revolutionary movement that led to the end of the 
Pahlavi regime was composed of a multitude of factions and groups reflecting a multitude of 
ideologies and political aspirations regarding post-Pahlavi Iran
41
, it was ultimately Khomeini 
and those that followed him that secured the future of Iran. Arguably this was because it was 
his populist discourse that held the ‘collective will’ of the ‘national-popular’. Once 
Mohammad Reza Shah was forced into exile in January 1979, a referendum on changing the 
country’s political system to an Islamic Republic was prepared42. Baqer Moin notes that in 
the weeks following the Revolution those who were opposed to the idea of the Islamic 
Republic ‘could expect to suffer damaging consequences’; thus, it was not surprising that ‘on 
30 and 31 March, 97 per cent of the electorate, including most of the secularist political 
organisations, voted “yes” to an Islamic Republic’43. This was the embodiment of 
Khomeini’s Vilayat-i Faqih (Guardianship of the Jurist), an ideology that was developed in 
the 1960s, disseminated through tapes and published in 1970 in his book Hukumat-i Islami 
(Islamic Government).
44
 Despite the pressure to vote ‘yes’, the referendum is upheld as 
evidence for the popularity of the Islamic Republic being of ‘the people’45, and therefore its 
populist credentials and its legacy of subalternity. 
This historical context helps make sense of the employment of Gramsci’s national-
popular in the context of how Islamic Republic ‘rulers’’ perceive their relationship with the 
‘ruled’, and the way in which the ‘self’ is constructed. Gramsci argued that in order for 
revolution to take place three elements need to be present: a ‘modern prince’, an alliance 
including the masses (the subaltern groups), and intellectual, cultural and moral reform of the 
masses. These three elements together constitute the ‘national-popular collective will’46. The 
modern prince’s role is crucial. He is responsible for proclaiming and organising ‘an 
intellectual and moral reformation’ that will facilitate the appropriate environment for the 
‘subsequent development of the national-popular collective will towards the realization of a 
superior, total form of modern civilization.
47
 Ultimately, revolution comes about when 
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subaltern groups (Iranian masses) overthrow the hegemon (Pahlavi regime), and establish 
themselves as the new hegemon (the Islamic Republic), while maintaining the ‘national-
popular collective will’. Hegemony is understood here as economic, political, intellectual and 
moral leadership. In this regard, Gramsci states that in order for a dominant group to gain 
hegemony over subordinate groups, it is necessary to bring about ‘not only a unison of 
economic and political aims, but also intellectual and moral unity’: ‘the supremacy of a social 
group manifests itself in two ways, as “domination” and as “intellectual and moral 
leadership”.’48  
The term ‘subaltern’ can be used to represent those groups in society that are 
marginalised by or subjected to the hegemon or dominant group. While it is not a concept 
that is systematically analysed in Gramsci’s work49, it is clear that Gramsci is not necessarily 
simply referring to a single group in society. It is used to refer to non-commissioned military 
groups, those in positions of subordination, and finally to social class
50
. In a discussion of the 
Catholic Church Gramsci refers to ‘the subaltern intellectual stratum (primary and secondary 
school teachers, priests etc.)’51 The subaltern is also implicit in Gramsci’s references to rural 
masses and the popular masses
52
. The role of the subaltern is fundamental in the process of 
revolution because without them revolution cannot take place. This is because the ‘national-
popular collective will’ cannot be achieved without the inclusion of the masses, the subaltern 
groups in society, which are to burst ‘simultaneously into political life’.53 Indeed, this 
awakening and development of a ‘national-popular collective will’ exists when there is a 
‘Jacobin force’ as there was during the French Revolution54. Thus, as David Forgacs notes, ‘a 
national-popular movement is one in which a fundamental class becomes hegemonic at a 
national level by drawing subaltern social groups into an alliance.’55 
It can be debated whether or not those in favour of the 1979 Revolution were strictly 
speaking, in the Gramscian sense, the ‘subaltern’. Indeed, the importance of class in 
Gramsci’s analysis suggests that it cannot be applied to the Iranian case because it was not 
only ‘rural’ and ‘popular masses’ that were involved; the revolution was also very much 
urban with the middle classes playing a crucial role.
56
 It is this issue of class that divides 
Marxist and post-Marxists in their view of Gramsci. Unsurprisingly post-Marxists are 
critiqued because they feel class is fundamental to Gramsci’s analysis and therefore 
Gramscian analysis
57
. Whereas those who follow Laclau, feel that class does not need to be at 
the centre of the notion of hegemon. Indeed, the hegemonic project has ‘ceased to have any 
necessary link with class’58. Furthermore, ‘Laclau extends the logic of non-class belonging or 
contingency to all political discourses’59. Thus, in this instance the subaltern is understood as 
those who saw themselves as marginalised by and subjected to the hegemony of the Pahlavi 
regime. This is not necessarily linked to class. 
As noted above, the ‘national- popular collective will’ shall lead to a ‘total form of 
modern civilization’. Epifanio San Juan notes that ‘Gramsci envisioned the “national-
popular” as a process of lay intellectuals expanding and elaborating a secular “humanism” 
attuned to the grassroots’60. The point here is whether a religious movement can be 
considered modern, when here modernity is associated with a secular project. The aim of 
establishing an Islamic republic is clearly not secular. Nevertheless, the ‘modernity’ of the 
1979 Revolution and parallels with secular revolutions has been highlighted on a number of 
occasions. Ramin Jahanbegloo argues that rather than perceiving the transformation of a Shi’i 
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hierocracy into a political regime as an ‘irreconcilable clash between “tradition” and 
“modernity”’, it should be considered more in terms of ‘a series of ontological and 
anthropological encounters between the two’61. For Ervand Abrahamian, ‘Khomeinism’ had 
more in line with Latin American populism than the Shi’i tradition62. This resemblance was 
evident in the middle-class nature of the movement, which ‘mobilized the masses with 
radical-sounding rhetoric against the external powers and the entrenched power-holding 
classes’63. Populism was reflected in the language used ‘against the ruling elite’; it also 
‘claimed to be a “return to native roots” and a means for eradicating “cosmopolitan ideas” 
and charting a noncapitalist, noncommunist “third way” toward development.’64 Larry Ray 
contends that the ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ of the 1979 Revolution can be considered as a 
‘form of modernist revolutionary populism’. He suggests a parallel between the 1979 
Revolution and the French Revolution’s Jacobin phase65; a parallel also asserted by Nikki 
Keddie and Ali Ansari.
66
 The 1979 Revolution’s ‘modernity’ is also evident in the nationalist 
character of the Revolution. To this end, Ansari argues that ‘it took religious nationalism to 
free Iranian nationalism from its elite pretensions and make it popular.’ And, it was ‘religious 
nationalism’ that was evident in the 1979 Revolution67. Thus, the Islamic aspect of the 
Revolution does not take away from its ‘modernity’. 
Simply having the subaltern on board is insufficient in establishing a ‘national-
popular collective will’. This is because, if the hegemony of the subaltern group is to be 
achieved, there must be the moral, intellectual and cultural reform of the masses; and it is the 
modern prince that is to carry out the reform. For Gramsci, ‘The modern prince, the myth 
prince, cannot be a real person, a concrete individual’; rather, it can only be organism, a 
complex element of society’. This organism is the political party68. In the case of the 1979 
Revolution, there was not a ‘political party’ in the Gramscian sense. While there were several 
ideas represented by different groups and factions being articulated through various 
discourses, as noted above, that which championed and was able to establish itself as a 
hegemon was the populist discourse and ideas of a single figure, namely Khomeini. Gramsci 
presents an image of the modern prince in ‘State and Civil society’ that is more open than 
that portrayed in ‘The Modern Prince’. Here, in addition to being a head of state, or leader of 
government, Gramsci states that the “Prince” could also be ‘a political leader whose aim is to 
conquer a State, or found a new type of State’69. While Khomeini and his followers may not 
qualify as a political party, they certainly do fit with this more open understanding of the 
modern prince.  
The contention advocated by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith that the idea 
of nation-popular is cultural rather than political would also make the use of the national-
popular put forward here problematic. They argue that the national-popular ‘is a cultural 
concept, relating to the position of the masses within the culture of the nation, and radically 
alien to any form of populism or “national socialism”’70. My response to this is three-fold. 
First, the way in which they view populism, as a particular ideology akin to ‘national 
socialism’, is problematic. Rather, it should be considered in terms of discourse that 
constructs ‘the people’ as a popular subject in opposition to an ‘other’, as illustrated above. 
The second points relates to the role of the masses in relation to the desire for hegemony. 
Hoare and Nowell Smith’s contention suggests that establishing a culture for a nation is not a 
political project. However, if there is to be a national-popular culture, the very act of creating 
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one is a political project in itself. Related to this, is the third point. In the case of Iran, 
arguably Khomeini’s political aspiration was made possible through the cultural and 
intellectual reform of the masses by means of disseminating his understanding of Islam. 
Importantly, the culture of Islam was politicised in a particular way. 
Overall, it is the process outlined by Gramsci that illustrates the significance of the 
populist discourse articulated by Islamic Republic elites. This process is symbolised by the 
significance of the ‘national-popular collective will’. Each hegemon has its own moral, 
political and intellectual leadership and in turn has subaltern groups being marginalised by 
that particular hegemony. The process of political transformation outlined by Gramsci, that is 
the role of the modern prince to bring about a national-popular collective will that brings 
together the subaltern masses by means of cultural, intellectual and moral reform, helps 
explain the importance of ‘the people’ in bringing about revolution. They are constructed as a 
popular subject. So while Gramsci’s analysis is positioned in a particular historical 
experience, the process of political transformation can be applied to other historical or indeed 
contemporary experiences. 
In the case of contemporary Iran, Gramsci’s concept of ‘national-popular collective 
will’ highlights a historical trajectory that allows us to examine the most recent stage in a 
particular political transformation: a political system that exists 35 years after the revolution 
and is adamant in displaying its populist credentials through its legacy of subalternity. This is 
a situation of post-subaltern hegemony. This framework helps explain the process of a 
populist discourse transforming from one that is subaltern into a one that is hegemonic. It is 
the process following this political transformation that is now of interest.  
Populist discourse: The Islamic Republic as ‘the people’ 
The populist discourse articulated by Islamic Republic ruling elites, such as Khamenei and 
Rouhani, is undoubtedly a means of legitimising the position of the Islamic Republic as 
hegemon in the state. Furthermore, in order maintain its legitimacy it needs to uphold its 
legacy of subalternity. To do this, the ruling elites need to ensure that the Islamic Republic 
continues to be the beholder of the ‘national-popular collective will’ that facilitated the 1979 
Revolution. However, as noted above, the popular uprisings following the re-election of the 
incumbent Ahmadinejad in 2009 threatened the status of the Islamic Republic as constructed 
by Khamenei, Ahmadinejad and their followers. Amongst the protestors were those in favour 
of the ideals of former President Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005) and presidential 
candidates Mir-Hussein Mousavi and Mehdi Karoubi, who called for the reform of the 
Islamic Republic
71
. Others rejected Vilayat-i Faqih altogether and advocated an end to the 
Islamic Republic
72. Ansari argues that the regime’s failure ‘to get all Iranians to fall into line’ 
behind the re-election of Ahmadinejad represented a crisis of authority
73
. 
Nevertheless, in an attempt to maintain their legitimacy, and restore their authority, 
these ruling elites reasserted their populism by articulating a discourse that divided the social 
space of Iran’s political arena into two groups; them and us. This division was enforced by 
constructing a binary relationship between the ‘self’ and the ‘other’. In this case the ‘self’ was 
the Islamic Republic as constructed by Khamenei and Ahmadinejad along with their 
supporters. Here the ‘self’ was constructed as the legitimate representative of ‘the people’. 
The ‘other’ was those who were involved in the protests against the election of Ahmadinejad. 
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Khamenei condemned the protests, accusing the protestors of being the tools of foreign 
enemies and consequently a threat to the Islamic Republic
74
. While the uprising was 
essentially popular, protestors were delegitimised by being constructed as the tool of foreign 
enemies that were intent on destroying the Islamic Republic from within. They were a 
‘threat’75. It is argued that in face of this perceived threat from the ‘other’, the Islamic 
Republic needed to reconstruct the ‘self’ in order to be able to convincingly articulate a 
populist discourse whereby it is the beholder of the ‘national-popular collective will’. This 
process is represented by Khamenei allowing Rouhani to stand as president in 2013. It 
illustrates an attempt to recapture the ‘national-popular collective will’ and restore the Islamic 
Republic’s legacy of subalternity. 
Rouhani’s presidential candidacy is symbolic because he was permitted to stand by 
Khamenei and supported by Khatami. Furthermore, as noted above, once Rouhani was 
elected Khamenei wanted to avoid further protests. In the aftermath of the 2009-10 popular 
uprising this suggests an attempt to bring the nation back together. Khamenei’s support at the 
time was evident in allowing Rouhani to stand as president; candidates are only permitted to 
stand as president once they have been vetted by the Supreme Leader. Furthermore, 
Khamenei and Rouhani have worked closely together. Rouhani was ‘Secretary of the 
National Security Council between 1989 and 2005 and accordingly served as the chief 
nuclear negotiator with the EU-3 group during Khatami’s presidency’76. It is perhaps not 
surprising, therefore that his candidacy was also supported and encouraged by Khatami.  
Khatami’s support is significant because of what Khatami represents in Iranian 
politics. Firstly, the ideals of Khatami’s reformist presidency represent a more liberal 
understanding of the Islamic Republic than that of Khamenei. Under his administration, civil 
society expanded, the women’s movement flourished and public society was relatively 
liberalised
77
. Indeed, he embarked upon ‘expanding citizen’s participation in the political 
domain’78, or the ‘citizenisation of society’79. Khatami’s political Islam was a post-Islamist80 
one that advocated mardumsalari-yi Islami (Islamic democracy).
81
 This was to be achieved 
through ‘freedom, equality, and possession of rights’ through which ‘the people’ are able to 
truly enjoy civil and political rights
82. Also integral to Khatami’s reformist agenda was 
‘dialogue among civilisations’. In terms of international politics, this meant that better and 
constructive relations between Iran and the ‘West’ were advocated as well as a move out of 
isolation.
83
 Secondly, Khatami was also instrumental in Mousavi’s 2009 presidential 
campaign against the incumbent Ahmadinejad, who was supported by Khamenei, as noted 
above. Finally, following the 2009-10 popular uprising Khatami is associated with Mousavi 
and Karoubi by those who reject reformist approaches to the Islamic Republic. In February 
2011, Mousavi and Karoubi, and Zahra Rahnavard (Mousavi’s wife who campaigned 
alongside him) were placed under house arrest. In this context Khatami is also associated 
with the rejection of Khamenei’s construction of the Islamic Republic and consequently the 
hegemonic ‘other’ that threatens the populist and legitimate Islamic Republic. 
With these issues in mind, Rouhani’s candidacy demonstrates awareness that in 2009 
the regime did not have the entire ‘national-popular collective will’ and that the ‘self’ was 
threatened by what was thought to be a potentially hegemonic ‘other’. The implication of this 
is that the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic as constructed by Khamenei was threatened. In 
this context Rouhani acts as a means of ensuring the ‘national-popular collective will’ and 
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thus restoring, ironically, the hegemony of the ‘self’, which is perceived to be the only 
legitimate government because of the role of the ‘national-popular’ in 1979.  
Once elected, Rouhani’s discursive construction of the Islamic Republic as a popular 
subject illustrates the continuation of a post-subaltern hegemonic populist discourse. We see 
the continued articulation of the Islamic Republic as ‘the people’ and the reassertion of the 
Islamic Republic’s legacy of subalternity. On the surface, it would seem that Rouhani is 
articulating a similar discourse to Khatami, one that talks about human rights and his plans 
for a civil rights charter
84
. However, considering the continued existence of political 
prisoners
85
 and the continued house arrest of Mousavi, Karoubi and Rahnavard, it would also 
seem that Rouhani is not in favour of, or, unable to bring about an Islamic Republic that is 
more respectful of human rights. Rather, it is Rouhani’s use of language associated with ‘the 
people’ that reflects a populist discourse taking its legitimacy from its legacy of subalternity 
as well as being elected by ‘the people’.  
This populist discourse, through the construction of ‘the people’ as a popular subject 
is reflected in the use of language. In particular, this is use of terms that invoke ‘the people’ 
such as muntakhib-i mardum (elected by the people), mardumi (of the people), and 
mardumsalari (‘democracy’ or rule by the people). They reflect a populist discourse whereby 
the Islamic Republic constructs the ‘self’ as ‘the people’. Implicit in the terms mardumsalari, 
muntakhib-i mardum and mardumi are the belief that despite having succeeded in becoming 
the state government, the hegemon, the Islamic Republic maintains its position as the 
beholder of the ‘national-popular collective will’, and therefore its legacy of subalternity.  
Rouhani’s populist discourse is clearly articulated in the months following his 
election. On a number of occasions Rouhani talks about how his election represents the 
victory of the nation. For instance, in his first press conference he states that ‘The nation was 
victorious’86. He also goes on to explain in a number of ways how his election due to the 
great nation’s participation in their numbers.87 This populist discourse is also articulated in 
response to a question from NBC’s Ann Curry regarding Israel’s Prime Minister Benyamin 
Netanyahu’s description of Rouhani as a ‘wolf in sheep’s clothing’ in his 2013 United 
Nations General Assembly speech.
88
 Rouhani responds by stating that ‘an occupier and 
usurper government’ such as Israel, ‘shouldn't allow itself to give speeches about a 
democratically and freely elected government that has come about by means of the free votes 
of the people.’89 This is in itself may not be significant. After all, it is not unusual for recently 
elected political leaders to highlight the popular nature of their election. Nevertheless, this 
discourse constructs the ‘self’ as ‘the people’ because it asserts that the Islamic Republic is 
once again of ‘the people’. Furthermore, the way in which Rouhani positions his 
administration as one that is supported by Khamenei while subscribing to Khatami’s 
reformism is significant. In doing this, Rouhani actively adopts his role of re-establishing the 
‘national-popular collective will’.  
This significant positioning is explicit in Rouhani’s statement of confirmation in the 
Supreme Leader’s presence. Given on 4 August 2013, the day after he took office, Rouhani 
expresses particular concepts that position his ‘government of hope and prudence’ as one of 
moderation. The presence of Khamenei shows that the Supreme Leader, at least on this 
occasion, supports Rouhani’s aspirations. However, he is also appealing to those Iranians 
who favour Khatami. He states: 
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Moderation is an obvious characteristic of farhang-i Irani-Islami (Iranian-Islamic culture). Moderation 
is not a deviation from the foundations, nor does it demonstrate conservatism in the face of change and 




In this text Rouhani cleverly attempts to bring down the constructed internal frontier between 
‘them’ and ‘us’ in Iran’s political arena. This is an attempt to reduce the relation of 
antagonism, and thus essentially restore the Islamic Republic as the beholder of the ‘national-
popular collective will’. Irani-Islami culture was a major pillar of Khatami’s inclusive 
Islamist-Iranian discourse of national identity whereby both Iran’s pre-Islamic Iranian culture 
and its Islamic culture were constructed as integral to the identity of the Iranian nation.
91
 
However, by referring to mardumsalari-yi dini Rouhani is also addressing Khamenei’s 
supporters; mardumsalari-yi dini is the term used by Khamenei for the Islamic Republic.
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Finally, the reference to ‘foundations’ and ‘conservatism’, suggests that Rouhani is 
addressing the conservative elements of the Islamic Republic. For Rouhani, his government 
of hope, prudence and moderation is the one that can bring all these elements together. 
In terms of foreign affairs, Rouhani’s notion of ‘constructive engagement’ harks back 
to Khatami’s ‘dialogue among civilisations’, which was very popular among his supporters. 
In this context Khatami’s support for Rouhani is explicit. In September 2013, Khatami stated 
that ‘president Rouhani's platform of prudence and hope is a practical translation of the idea 
of dialogue among nations into the realm of politics.’93 In addition to this, as was the case 
with Khatami’s own ‘dialogue among civilisations’, he states that ‘constructive engagement’ 
and Rouhani’s government of ‘prudence and hope’ are not just about diplomacy with the 
‘West’. Rather, a particular type of dialogue should be the foundation of constructive 
engagement: ‘an emphasis on dialogue and mutual understanding globally’.94 In the 
framework of ‘constructive engagement’, Rouhani has been able to address the nuclear issue, 
the key to which, as noted at the beginning of this article, is the ‘people’. For, as far as this 
member of Iran’s ruling elite is concerned, without ‘the people’, Rouhani would not have 
been elected and this latest phase of the Islamic Republic would not have been ‘of the 
people’. However, whether ‘the people’ perceive Rouhani in this manner is another issue 
entirely. Nevertheless, Rouhani has been a useful tool with which to restore the Islamic 
Republic’s legacy of subalternity and add substance to its populist discourse.  
Conclusion  
Populist discourse is discourse that constitutes ‘the people’ as a popular subject in the context 
of a situation whereby an internal frontier is built that divides the social space into two 
camps
95
. In this situation there is a ‘relation of antagonism’96 whereby ‘the people’ (the 
‘self’) are constructed as the ‘underdogs’97 in relation to a hegemonic ‘other’. Importantly, 
‘the people’, only exist in so far as they are constructed as such through the articulation of 
discourse. In the case of Iran, I have shown how a populist discourse is articulated by the 
Islamic Republic’s ruling elites and how members of these ruling elites construct the Islamic 
Republic as ‘the people’. In addition to this, I have also illustrated that embedded in this 
process of construction there is a particular historical experience that continues to give the 
regime legitimacy. This particular historical experience is Iran’s 1979 Revolution. In this 
context, through the articulation of Khomeini’s populist discourse, ‘the people’, constructed 
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as the ‘self’, were in a relation of antagonism with the Pahlavi regime:  the hegemonic 
‘other’.  
The establishment of the Islamic Republic following the 1979 Revolution is an 
example of subaltern groups successfully overthrowing the state hegemon and establishing 
themselves as the hegemon because they had the ‘national-popular collective will’. Thus, 
being the beholder of the ‘national-popular collective will’ symbolises the importance of the 
legacy of subalternity. The experience of subalternity prior to the 1979 Revolution is crucial 
in understanding the current Islamic Republic. This is because, for Gramsci, without the 
‘national-popular collective will’, political transformation, or revolution, will not materialise. 
Indeed, as noted above, ultimately, revolution comes about when subaltern groups (Iranian 
masses) overthrow the hegemon (Pahlavi regime), and establish themselves as the new 
hegemon (the Islamic Republic), while maintaining the ‘national-popular collective will’.  
I would argue that while the position in society has changed, the populist discourse, 
while remaining fluid, is a discourse that has continued post-revolution. In this discourse, the 
Islamic Republic continues to construct itself as the beholder of the ‘national-popular 
collective will’. Now there is essentially a post-subaltern hegemonic populism; a discourse 
that perceives itself as championing the ‘nation-popular collective will’ because of its legacy 
in the period leading to the 1979 Revolution and the establishment of Islamic Republic. This 
legacy of subalternity is crucial to understanding the Islamic Republic in terms of its 
perception of the ‘self’. However, the 2009-10 popular uprisings suggested that the Islamic 
Republic’s position as beholder of the ‘national-popular collective will’ was under threat. It 
has been illustrated that Rouhani’s presidential candidacy is a means of restoring that 
‘national-popular collective will’. And, indeed, with Rouhani, the Islamic Republic has 
continued to articulate a populist discourse that constructs the ‘self’ as ‘the people’ despite no 
longer being a subaltern in domestic politics. Its legacy of subalternity continues to be 
embedded in this populist discourse. 
By using a combination of the notion of populist discourse and Gramsci’s ‘national-
popular collective will’, I have tried to illustrate and highlight the importance of the legacy of 
subalternity. An appreciation of the legacy of subalternity allows for a deeper interrogation of 
how post-revolution governments perceive themselves and subsequently their relationship 
with ‘the people’ and the ‘ruled’. 
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